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NOTES
WRONGFUL DEATH IN WYOMING: TWO CAUSES OF ACTION?
A was injured as a result of B's actionable negligence. After an
extended period of intense suffering, he died from the injuries thus sustained. A was not contributorily negligent; nor did he, at any time prior
to his death, effectuate a release of his cause of action against B. Left
surviving A were his four children. Two of the children were adults
born to A's first marriage and two were minors born during his second
marriage. The minor children lived with A and were dependent upon
him for their support. They were the sole beneficiaries named in A's
will. Neither of A's wives survived him. At the time of the accident B
was carrying liability insurance. An executor was named and qualified
and now wishes to settle all claims which he may have against the assured
in that capacity.
In Wyoming it has been the common practice of attorneys and claims
adjusters, when presented with a claim for wrongful death, to make a
settlement with the executor of the estate by acquiring a release of
the cause of action based on the wrongful death act. (Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-1065,
1-1066 [19571.) It has not been common for the adjuster or attorney
[171]
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to make a settlement on the survival statute. (Wyo. Stat. § 1-28 (1957)).
This prictice should be examined to determine its adequacy in all instances.
Does the above hypothetical case present a situation from which two
causes of action can arise? If so, from whom must the adjuster or attorney
obtain a release in order to protect his client company, the company's
policy holder, and himself?
The Wrongful Death Act provides a remedy:'
Whenever the death of a
negelct or default, and
would (if death had not
to maintain an action to

person shall be caused by wrongful act,
the act, neglect or default is such as
ensued) have entitled the party injured
recover damages in respect thereof . . .

Two types of death acts are recognized. Some are said to be survival
statutes. 2 Others, like Wyoming's, are said to create a new cause of
action. In Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, the Wyoming Supreme Court
said: 3
It is a survival statute in the sense that damages may now be
recovered for the wrongful act nothwithstanding that death may
result, whether instantaneously or otherwise. It gives a new
cause of action for the same reason and for the further reason
that the action is not one transferred from the decedent to the
administrator but is one given directly to the administrator ...
The requirement that the decendent should have had a cause of action in
order that the executor would be able to commence an action for wrongful
death is a condition precedent to his right to bring the action. Its effect
is to allow the tortfeasor any defense against the administrator which he
would have had against the decedent. The statute was enacted to overcome the common law doctrine that the death of a human being is not a
4
grounds for an action in the civil courts.
The statute provides that damages recovered shall go to such persons
as may be determined by the statute on intestate descent. The damages
are not subject to claims of creditors.5 Damages recoverable include
those for: 6
...the amount the survivors failed or will fail, by reason of the
death, to receive out of the decedent's earnings, any other pecuniary loss directly or proximately sustained by the survivors by reason
of such death including funeral expenses and further the court
or jury may add, as an element of damages a reasonable sum for
the loss of comfort, care, advice and society of the decedent.
The statute clearly provides only for those damages which are incurred
subsequent to the death of the injured person. They include only those
which were sustained by those persons entitled to the proceeds of the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-1065 (1957).
Hale v. Fitzgerald, 247 Iowa 1194, 78 N.W.2d 509 (1956).
43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105, 107 (1931).
16 Am. Jur. 65.
See Tuttle v. Short et al., 42 Wyo. 1, 288 Pac. 524 (1930).
Wyo. Stat. § 1-1066 (1957).
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settlement. It provides for none of the damages which the decedent could
have recovered had he survived.
There are clear indications that only the executor or administrator
7
has the capacity to maintain the action for wrongful death. The statute
need only be given its plain meaning to reach this conclusion. It provides
that, "Every such action shall be brought by, and in the name of the
personal represnetative of such deceased person; . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
The personal representative acts as trustee for those persons designated
and not as an agent of the decedent's estate. 8 As trustee, the personal
representative is in a fiduciary relation to the survivors. If the insurance
company makes a settlement in good faith with an authorized personal
representative, its responsibility under the wrongful death statute is at an
9
end. It is not responsible for the proper distribution of the proceeds.
The application of this rule should work no hardship on the beneficiaries.
If the personal representative should abscond with the proceeds or by
mistake give them to the wrong person, the injured party should have a
cause of action on the executor's bond. 10 A majority of the courts which
have decided the question agree that even though the personal representative is acting as a trustee for designated beneficaries, rather than the
estate, his sureties may be rendered liable for his misfeasance or malThe reasoning of these decisions is that the Wrongful Death
feasance."
Act created a new duty which became one of those which the executor had
sworn by oath to perform. Further, that the executor must show that he
has paid all sums of money due from him as personal representative of the
deceased before he will be discharged from liability. 12 By saying that
the money received in settlement of the wrougful death cause of action was
part of the proceeds for which the personal representative must account,
the courts have been able to reach his sureties. It would thus appear
that the beneficiaries could protect themselves by petitioning for additional bond.13 The executor, by requesting the court to make a determination of the beneficiaries, could protect himself from liability for mistake
14
in distribution.
To summarize, the personal representative is probably the only person
to bring the wrongful death action. Even thought he acts as a statutory
delegate in maintaining the action, the beneficiaries are protected from
any malfeasance or misfeasance or the executor's doing by his bond.
The insurance company has fulfilled its responsibility. Therefore, the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Ashley v. Read Const. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727 (Wyo., 1961) ; c.f., Massion v. Mt. Sanai,
40 Wyo. 297, 276 Pac. 930 (1929).
Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931).
See Wyo. Stat. § 4-3 (1957).
See Wyo. Stat. § 2-122 (1957), Wyo. R.C.P. 17 (a) (1957).
Sisk v. Pressley et al., 81 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. S.C., 1948); United States Fidelity & G.
Co. v. Decker, 122 Ohio 285, 171 N.E. 333 (1931) ; Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Young,
107 Okla. 151, 231 Pac. 261 (1924).
See Wyo. Stat. § 2-324 (1957).
See Wyo. Stat. § 2-133 (1957).
2 Wyo. L.J. 109.
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adjuster or attorney should be safe in obtaining only the executor's release
in respect to the Wrongful Death Act.
If the Wrongful Death Act provides the only cause of action available,
the release thereof by the executor ends the problem. However, we also
have a survival statute which provides: 15
In addition to causes of action which survive at common law,
causes of action . . . for injuries to the person shall also survive
. . . provided that in an action for personal injury damages, if
the person otherwise entitled thereto dies, recoverying (recovery)
shall be limited to damages for wrongful death.
In general, a survival statute provides for damages to the deceased party
suffered by him from the time of accident until his death. The injuries
include pain and suffering of the decedent, the loss of wages up to the
time of death, the loss of companionship of his wife and children, and
expenses incurred, necessitated by the injuries, in the nature of hospital
and medical expenses. 16 If any action is prosecuted to successful conclusion under the survival statute, the resultant proceeds may be of no
benefit whatever to those persons who would take by virtue of the wrongful
death settlement. This is because the survival staute allows the estate to
maintain the same action which the decedent could have maintained.
The cause of action passes from the decedent to the personal representative
and it becomes one of the assets of the estate. 17 The action is commenced
by the executor in his capacity as agent for the estate.
Do the Wrongful Death Act and the survival statute provide concurrent remedies? The importance of this question is twofold. First,
it is important to the insurance company and those persons directly
aligned with its interests. It is in the best interest of the company to
settle all just claims and to close its files on the case as soon a possible
with assurance that it will not be necessary to reopen it. Several situations
are readily forseeable, once it is assumed that there are concurrent
remedies available, in which this interest will not have been satisfied by
obtaining a release only of the wrongful death cause of action. There
may be an instance where an action on the survived cause is commenced
subsequent to a settlement on the Wrongful Death Act. The limitation on
most torts in four years. s An action could thus be commenced on the
survived cause of atcion after termination of the limitation on the Wrongful Death Act, which is two years. Another possibility is that the insurance
company might pay all of the policy value in settlement of the Wrongful
Death Act claim. Secondly, it is important to the personal representative
to know what settlements he must make in order to fulfill his obligations
as agent of the estate. If the survival statute provides a cause of action
which he does not settle, he may be subjected, along with his sureties, to a
suit for misfeasance in fiduciary capacity.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Wyo. Stat.
Mahoning
Mahoning
Wyo. Stat.

§ 1-28 (1957).
Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 397, 83 N.E. 601 (1908).
Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, supra note 16.
§ 1-18 (1957).
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The question of concurrent remedies arises because of the present
trend among courts to allow the plaintiff in a law action to recover on all
possible grounds. A recent illustration of this is the Kansas case of
Prowant v. King X. Inc.19 where, on rehearing, the court overruled a construction of their survival statute which had been upheld for eighty-two
years.
The courts have gotten around the doctrine of res judicata on the
basis that all the beneficiaries of the two actions must be the same before
21
it applies.20 The Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
This court, however, cannot agree that the real parties in interest
are exactly the same, nor that the causes of action are identical.
Under section 10772, the death action is to be prosecuted by the
administrator, for exclusive benefit of the wife or husband and
children, .

.

. The atcion prosecuted under section 11235 is for

the benefit of the estate.
The damages recoverable under the two statutes are for different phases
of the results of the Wrongful Death Act. In reference to a revived action,
22
the Ohio Supreme Court said:
• . . the revived action and the latter (for wrongful death) are
not the same. They rest primarily upon the same alleged negligence of the defendant and the same absence of contributory
negligence of the injured person; but in the revived action the
damages are for the personal injuries to the injured person for
which the action would lie if death had not ensued, and such
damages to inure when recovered to the benefit of the estate,
while in the latter action the suit is prosecuted in the interest of
the other parties and the measure of damages is the pecuniary
loss they have sustained.
In the same case the court said that the majority of the courts favored
the recognition of two independent causes of action.
The problem of determining the availability of concurrent remedies
under the Wyoming statutes must turn upon the construction which may
be given to that part of the survival statute which provides that, ".

.

. in

acions for personal injury damages, if the person otherwise entitled thereto,
dies, recovering shall be limited to damage for wrongful death." No other
court has had to consture the meaning of similar restriction on a survival
statute. The provision is unique to the Wyoming statute. The true
meaning of the words is so obscure as to defy confident construction.
Upon casual reading, one might conclude that it allowed only the cause
of action on the wrongful death statute to survive. There are two basic
reasons for believing that the supreme court might apply a meaning
which would also allow recovery on the survival statute. The legislature,
in the same session that the above restriction was placed on the survival
statute, amended the Death Act to give it a self-contained survival pro19.
20.
21.
22.

185 Kan. 602, 347 P.2d 254 (1959).
Restatement, Judgments § 92 (2) b (1942).
May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St. 110, 165 N.E. 576, 577 (1929).
Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 397, 83 N.E. 601, 607 (1908).
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vision.23 There would appear no reason to provide for the survival of
personal injury causes of action and then to restrict them to one which
would survive without the aid of the survival statute. Also, this construction would allow recovery only where the deceased person died of the
injuries complained of. The wrongful death statute does not provide
for recovery for damages to the survivors caused by injuries to the decedent
not causing death.
If A injured B so seriously that he would never again be capable of
supporting his family, and B then died from a natural cause before
securing a final judgment on the cause thus arising, the Wrongful Death
Act would give no remedy. If B had not died he could have recovered
damages which would have provided for himself and his family. If this
is the meaning, then by a quirk of fate the tortfeasor is freed from
liability.
There are additional reasons for the belief that the above construction
will not be given. The aforementioned trend to allow all possible actions
is one. The provision of the Wyoming Constitution which provides that
no person shall be denied justice for, "an injury done to the person," is
another. 24 Further, the legislature has instructed the courts to construe
the code of civil procedure liberally. The common law rule that statutes
in derogation thereof be strictly construed has no application. 25 These
points will not force a construction different from the one advanced
above, which would limit the interested parties to one cause of action for
wrongful death, but they could be strongly persuasive.
It is entirely possible that the court could conclude that the phrase
in question operates to limit the personal representative to a wrongful death
action only in situations where the injured party dies while an action
is pending trial or during trial. This construction is no less apparent than
the first when, upon examination of the survival statute, the shift from the
clause "cause of action," which had been used exclusively in all of the
preceding provisions of the statute, to the term "action," in the phrase upon
which it has been stated the determination of the question of two causes
of action must turn, is detected. This would be consisent with the ordinary
An
distinction made between an "action" and a "cause of action."
"action" is the pursuit of right in court.2 6 A "cause of action" is the right
to institute an "action" in court.2 7 This construction could easily be
expanded to mean that only when the party dies of the injuries complained of in such suit shall his survivors be restricted to recovery on the
Wrongful death statute. It is apparent that this construction will also
result in inconsistencies. The injured party who dies before commencing
any action will be in more favored position, in the eyes of the law, than
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-1065 (1957).
Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 8.
Wyo. Stat. § 1-2 (1957).
Ginzbery v. Wyman, 272 Mass. 499, 172 N.E. 614 (1930).
Viers v. Webb, 76 Mont. 38, 245 Pac. 257 (1926).
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his brother who institutes his action before he dies. In view
fact that most injured parties have recovered to a point where
will not ordinarily come as a result of the injuries complained
starting any action, this approach might seem more appealing
court. In effect, a cause of action for the tort would survive but an
therefor could not be revived.

of the
death
before
to the
action

What can be done to protect the insurance company until this
question has been decided? The best approach would be to make two
settlements with the executor or administrator. By acquiring a release
of both possible grounds, adequate protection should be provided for all
interested parties. By explaining to the personal representative that the
settlement on the survival statute is necessitated by the ambiguous wording
of it, and not as an admission that any action can be maintained under
it, a small settlement should be agreebale. A single release instrument as
to all possible causes of action could be employed with impunity if drafted
with particularity in view of the problems alluded to above. This would
leave to the personal representative the onerous task of distributing the
award among the two groups of beneficiaries. In any event, it would seem
proper to assume that all contingencies can be covered by dealing exclusively with the personal representative.
The legislature's problem is to determine what actions shall survive
the death of the injured party. If only the Wrongful Death Act is to
survive, this could be shown by changing the survival statute to read
"provided that, in any action for personal injury damages, if the injured
party dies, recovery shall be limited to an action on the Wrongful Death
Act when it is applicable." If the legislature intended that all causes of
action for personal injury should survive the injured party, as well as the
tortfeasor, the restriction should be dropped altogether. A -middle position
might be taken by saying: "provided that, on a cause of action for personal
injury damages, if the injured person dies, of the injuries complained,
recovery shall be limited to an action on the Wrongful Death Act."
Clarification is needed to provide protection to all persons who deal
with or are involved in wrongful death actions. Until such time as the
needed amendment is made, the above suggestions as to settlements may
be helpful in providing maximum protection.
RICHARD

L.

BEAL

